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The Supreme Court Should Eliminate Its Lawless Shadow Docket
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1
Introduction
The Supreme Court has adopted a regular practice of making decisions that have the effect of
either allowing the government to take a major action or permanently blocking the government from
taking a major action without providing any explanation for its decision.2 It does this by either granting or
denying motions to stay lower court decisions to issue preliminary injunctions that bar the government
from implementing a major action until the courts have decided whether the action is legal. The Court’s
decisions granting and denying stays are referred to as the Court’s “shadow docket.”3
In theory, the Court’s decisions granting or denying motions for stays have only temporary effects
on the ability of the government to implement a major action. In fact, however, many of the Court’s
decisions to grant stays allow the government to implement the challenged action, thereby rendering
moot any controversy about the legality of the action.4 Conversely, many of the Court’s decisions that
deny stays have the practical effect of precluding the government from ever attempting to implement the
action.
A court can grant a motion to enjoin a government action pending the outcome of review on the
merits only if it determines that the petitioners are likely to prevail on the merits; failure to grant the
preliminary injunction would cause irreparable harm that exceeds the irreparable harm that would result
from a decision to deny the motion for a preliminary injunction; and issuance of the injunction will not
disserve the public interest.5 The criteria applicable to grant of a stay are identical to the criteria applicable
to grant of a motion for a preliminary injunction.6 In the context of major government actions, courts tend
to focus primarily on the first factor—whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits. In that
context, either grant or denial of a stay is likely to cause irreparable harm, and the court is likely to
conclude that the public interest would be served by staying the action if the petitioner is likely to prevail
on the merits and that the public interest would be served by refusing to stay the action if the petitioner
is not likely to prevail on the merits.
As recently as 2016, I characterized as “rare” decisions in which courts grant preliminary
injunctions that block agencies from implementing an action until the court decides the merits of the
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action.7 Until recently, the Supreme Court rarely granted a stay of either an agency action or a preliminary
injunction that stopped an agency from implementing an agency action pending review of the action. Both
preliminary injunctions and stays were considered extraordinary remedies that courts provided to
preserve the status quo ante only when there were unusually good reasons to believe that an action taken
by an agency or a court was unlawful and then only for the relatively short time required to review the
action on the merits.
That situation has changed dramatically in recent years. When the president or an agency takes
any major action, the state attorney generals who are members of the opposite party file both a complaint
and a motion for preliminary injunction in a district court with a track record of decisions that favor the
interests and perspectives of their party. The district court then issues a preliminary injunction. The
average number of nationwide preliminary injunctions issued by district courts has increased over the
past decade from three per year to eighteen per year.8
After a district court issues a preliminary injunction, the federal government can file a motion to
stay the district court action in a circuit court. If the circuit court denies the motion, the government can
file a motion for stay at the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then grants or denies the stay without
issuing an opinion. If it stays the preliminary injunction, the stay remains in effect until such time as the
Supreme Court reviews the merits of the action. During that time the government can implement the
action that was the subject of the preliminary injunction. The number of cases in which the government
has sought such a stay has increased over the last decade from less than one per year to over ten per
year.9
Like preliminary injunctions, stays are temporary. They expire when the Court issues a decision
on the merits. In most cases, however, the stay continues in effect for many years because it usually takes
that long for the Court to decide the merits of the case. In many cases, the decision to grant or deny a
motion for stay is the last action the Court takes in the case because the Court never issues an opinion on
the merits.
If the Court grants the stay, its unexplained order granting the stay allows the agency or the
president to take the action, thereby rendering moot the dispute with respect to the legality of the action.
Thus, for instance, we will never know whether President Trump’s reallocation of many billions of dollars
from projects for which Congress had appropriated funds to construction of a wall across the southern
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border was lawful or what, if any, limits apply to any future “emergency” presidential reallocations of
funds.10
Conversely, if the Supreme Court denies the stay of the preliminary injunction or issues its own
stay of the agency action without explaining its action, the agency is unlikely to attempt to take the action
in the future because of its expectation that the Supreme Court would block the agency action again
without providing any explanation for its decision. Thus, for instance, we will never know why the Court
stayed the Clean Power Plan, the most significant action the government has taken in its efforts to mitigate
climate change.11 We can guess that the Court believed that the EPA action was unlawful in some respect,
but we will never know which of the six arguments that the petitioners made in support of their motion
to stay the action persuaded the Court that they were likely to prevail on the merits.12
There are many variations of this now common sequence of actions. Sometimes, the Supreme
Court denies the stay of the preliminary injunction without opinion, thereby leaving the preliminary
injunction in effect pending the outcome of the proceeding to review the merits of the action. Years later,
the Supreme Court has not yet issued any opinion in the case when a change in the party that controls
the Executive Branch creates conditions in which the government withdraws its support for the agency
action, thereby making it unlikely that the Court will ever issue an opinion on the merits of the agency
action.13
Each of those sequences of actions raises serious questions about our ability to continue to be
governed by the rule of law. In the first sequence, we have no way of knowing whether the action the
agency took was lawful. We have only the opinion of the district judge who granted the preliminary
injunction and the unexplained decision of the Supreme Court to stay that decision. We can make an
educated guess that the Supreme Court disagreed` with the district court in some respect, but we have
no way of knowing why the Supreme Court disagreed with the district judge.
In a typical case, there are many plausible reasons for that disagreement, and we can only
speculate about the Court’s reasons for disagreeing with the district judge. The disagreements could be
based on the Court’s evaluation of one of several alleged substantive flaws in the agency decision, one or
more alleged flaws in the procedures the agency used to make the decision, the district court’s reasons
for concluding that the public interest favored issuance of the preliminary injunction, or the district court’s
reasons for concluding that the preliminary injunction was required to avoid some form of irreparable
harm to the petitioners that exceeds the irreparable harm that the government would suffer as a result
of issuance of the preliminary injunction.
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We also have no way of knowing whether the agency action was lawful in the second sequence.
We have only the opinion of the district judge who granted the preliminary injunction and the unexplained
decision of the Supreme Court to deny the motion to stay the preliminary injunction. We have no way of
knowing whether the Supreme Court agreed with the district judge’s conclusion that the agency was likely
to lose on the merits based on one of several alleged substantive flaws in the agency action or whether
the Court agreed with the district judge that the agency was likely to lose on the merits based on one of
several alleged flaws in the procedures that the agency used to take the action. It is even possible that the
Supreme Court disagreed with the district judge’s reasoning with respect to all of the alleged flaws in the
agency action but decided not to stay the preliminary injunction because it disagreed with the judge’s
conclusion that a preliminary injunction was in the public interest or the judge’s conclusion that the
agency action would create irreparable harm to the petitioners that exceeds the irreparable harm that
the government would suffer as a result of issuance of the preliminary injunction.
An Illustrative Case
I will illustrate the reasons for my concern about the shadow docket by describing yet another
variation of the typical sequence. During the Obama administration, EPA issued the Clean Power Plan
(CPP).14 The CPP was by far the most ambitious attempt by the government to reduce the rate at which
the climate is changing. It required massive fuel-switching by electric utilities from coal to natural gas and
from coal to wind or solar.15 Since use of natural gas to generate electricity produces less than half the
emissions of carbon dioxide that use of coal produces, and use of solar or wind to generate electricity
produces no emissions of carbon dioxide, fuel switching is by far the most effective way of reducing the
effects of electricity generation on climate change.
Many Republican State Attorney Generals joined many electric generating companies in filing
petitions to review the CPP and motions to stay the CPP. The. D.C. Circuit denied their motion for a stay.16
The Supreme Court then took the unprecedented action of granting the stay before any court issued an
opinion on the merits.17 The Justices divided five to four but neither the majority nor the dissent wrote an
opinion. The stay was to last until either the D.C. Circuit issues an opinion on the merits of the CPP and
the Supreme Court denies a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit opinion or the
Supreme Court issues a decision on the merits of the CPP. It is unlikely that either of those events will ever
take place.
In 2019, EPA in the Trump administration repudiated the CPP and replaced it with the Affordable
Clean Energy rule (ACE).18 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petitions to review the CPP in light of the
combination of the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP and the EPA’s repudiation of the CPP. Many
Democratic State Attorney Generals joined numerous environmental advocacy organizations in filing

14

80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (2015).
The CPP is described in detail in Emily Hammond & Richard Pierce, The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 G.W. J. En. & Env. 1 (2016).
16
See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016).
17
See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Mem) (2016).
18
84 Fed. Reg. 32,523 (2019).
15

4

petitions to review the ACE rule. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit then vacated the ACE rule based on its
holding that the rule was unlawful.19 Both the majority and the dissent wrote lengthy opinions.20
Depending on whether you believe the claims of the EPA in the Trump administration or the
claims of the petitioners, the ACE rule would have had either modest beneficial effects in mitigating
climate change by slightly reducing emissions of carbon dioxide or it would actually have accelerated the
rate at which the climate is changing by increasing emissions of carbon dioxide. The Trump EPA attempted
to defend the ACE rule based on only one argument—that issuance of the ACE rule was the most effective
action that EPA could take to mitigate climate change because EPA lacked the power to issue the far more
effective CPP.21 That lone justification for issuing the ACE rule created a strange situation. The D.C. Circuit
could decide whether the ACE rule was valid only by deciding whether the CPP that was issued by the
Obama EPA and repudiated by the Trump EPA was lawful.
The petitioners who persuaded the Supreme Court to stay the CPP argued that it was invalid for
six reasons.22 The members of the D.C. Circuit who debated the validity of the ACE rule wrote lengthy
opinions in which they debated the merits of each of the six arguments that EPA and its allies made in
support of EPA’s decision to repudiate the CPP and to issue the ACE rule. Those were the same arguments
that the petitioners who challenged the validity of the CPP used to persuade the Supreme Court to stay
the CPP.23 As a result, we now know a great deal about the contrasting views of three members of the
D.C. Circuit with respect to the issues raised by the CPP and the ACE rule.
We also know that the D.C. Circuit has, in effect, upheld the validity of the CPP in its opinion on
the merits of the ACE rule.24 As the dissenting judge noted, however, it is difficult to reconcile the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion on the merits of the ACE rule and the CPP with the Supreme Court’s order that stayed
the CPP.25 The Supreme Court’s stay order almost certainly was based in part on the views of five Justices
that the EPA was unlikely to be able to support the legality of the CPP on the merits. It follows that a
majority of Justices almost certainly disagree with the reasoning and conclusion of the majority of the D.C.
Circuit panel with respect to one or more of the six important issues that the D.C. Circuit resolved in the
process of holding that the ACE rule was invalid because the CPP was valid.
We will never know the views of the Justices on the six important issues that the D.C. Circuit
resolved in ways that almost certainly are inconsistent with the views of a majority of Justices. EPA in the
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Biden administration has withdrawn its support for the ACE rule, so the Supreme Court will not have
occasion to address those issues in the process of reviewing the merits of the ACE rule. The Supreme Court
is also highly unlikely to have an opportunity to address the merits of the CPP directly. The D.C. Circuit
understandably dismissed the petitions to review the CPP once the EPA in the Trump administration
repudiated it. EPA in the Biden administration is highly unlikely to attempt to reissue the CPP because of
the extraordinary negative reception that it got from the Supreme Court when it was issued by EPA during
the Obama administration.
This sequence of actions and its many variants have created a situation in which the Supreme
Court is taking actions on its shadow docket that have a wide variety of permanent major effects without
ever providing any explanation for its actions. The Supreme Court’s shadow docket is large and growing.
During the George W. Bush and Obama administrations from 2000-2016, the federal government only
sought emergency injunctive relief from the Supreme Court eight times in total, and the Court granted
only four of those requests. In contrast, the Trump Administration sought emergency relief from the
Supreme Court 41 times in four years, and the Court granted 28 of those requests either in full or in part.26
The Supreme Court’s actions in this important line of cases contrasts starkly with the approach
the Court has taken when it has reviewed agency actions on the merits during the same period of time. In
many of its opinions issued during the last few years the Court has emphasized the importance of the duty
to engage in reasoned decision making.27 The Court has held numerous agency actions unlawful because
the agency did not comply with the most fundamental duty of any agency or court—it failed to provide
an explanation for its action that is anchored in the language of statutes or the constitution and consistent
with the available evidence.
I have joined many other scholars in praising this line of cases.28 It is ironic and disturbing that the
Supreme Court has taken many actions that have major permanent effects without providing any legal
basis for those actions during this same period of time. The Court would have held all of the actions it took
on its shadow docket to be arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law if they had been taken
by any agency. It is not an overstatement to characterize this long list of Supreme Court actions as lawless,
in the sense that the Court has never provided any explanation for any of the actions.
How Did We Get Here?
We now have a situation in which a high proportion of major judicial decisions are made by the
Supreme Court without providing any reasons for the decisions. To understand how we reached this point
we must start with the extreme political polarization that now characterizes the country.29 That
polarization has been growing for decades.30 When it is combined with the unusually difficult process that
26
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the U.S. Constitution requires to enact a statute, political polarization makes it extremely difficult for
Congress to enact or amend any major regulatory statute.31
As a result, when an agency encounters a new problem it typically must search for a solution in a
statute that was enacted thirty to eighty years ago by a Congress that could not have anticipated the
problem that the agency is attempting to address.32 Thus, for instance, when the FCC decides how to
regulate internet service providers, it must rely primarily on the Communications Act of 1934,33 a statute
that was enacted long before the internet was created. Similarly, when EPA decides how to mitigate
climate change, it must rely primarily on the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970.34 The CAA was last amended in
1990, and those amendments did not address climate change.
When a newly elected president takes office in these political conditions, his advisors tell him that
it would be an exercise in futility to attempt to persuade Congress to enact or amend a statute by giving
an agency the tools it needs to address today’s problems.35 The president then must choose either to
ignore today’s problems or to instruct agencies to search through old statutes to find some provision that
might provide a mechanism to address a modern problem.36 The agency then finds the best candidate
among the old statutory provisions and attempts to use it as the basis for an action that will address the
new problem. In today’s legal environment, the agency almost always must base its actions on a provision
of an old statute that was never intended to be used for the purpose of addressing a modern problem.
Leaders of the opposition party are incensed by the administration’s attempt to stretch its
statutory authority in an effort to address a problem in a way that is favored by the president’s party but
that is strongly opposed by the opposition party.37 The Supreme Court has empowered one subset of
those opposition party leaders to take immediate action when they believe that the administration has
overstepped its statutory boundaries. In its 2007 opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that
states always have standing to challenge any action of the federal government that threatens any
sovereign interest of a state. 38
State Attorney Generals of both parties have interpreted that opinion as an invitation for them to
obtain high visibility in their parties by challenging every major government action that is inconsistent
with their party’s preferences. In today’s polarized political environment, the vast majority of major
actions that are taken by agencies in any administration are inconsistent with the preferences of the
opposition party. Attorney Generals who are members of the opposition party band together to challenge
most of the major actions that are taken by agencies. They can always establish their standing to obtain
review of the agency action by identifying some way in which a major agency action adversely affects
some sovereign interest of one of the states.
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Since the jurisdiction and venue provisions of most of the statutes that agencies rely on as the
basis for major actions allow complaints to be filed in any district, the attorney generals then search the
nation for the district court that is most likely to view the major agency action with suspicion and to view
the arguments of the Attorney Generals with sympathy. They then file a complaint and a motion for a
preliminary injunction in that district court. In most cases, they are successful in obtaining the preliminary
judgment. The preliminary injunctions vary in scope. Some are limited to the district in which the court
sits, but many are nationwide.
The agency then files a motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction in a circuit court. If the
circuit court denies the motion, the government files a motion for stay in the Supreme Court. In some
cases, the Court grants the stay, typically until such time as the Supreme Court either decides the case on
the merits or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari with respect to a circuit court opinion that decides
the merits of the case. In other cases, the Court denies the stay of the preliminary injunction. The Court
never accompanies its order granting or denying a stay with an opinion in which it explains why it granted
or denied the stay, though individual Justices sometimes write concurring or dissenting opinions in which
they provide some explanation for their vote.39
In most cases, the Supreme Court never has any occasion either to decide the merits of the case
or to deny a petition for a writ of certiorari with respect to a circuit court opinion that decides the merits
of the case. As a result, we know only the results of the case—the major agency action either goes into
effect or does not go into effect—but we never know why the Supreme Court allowed the action to
become effective or refused to allow the action to become effective.
It would be easy to solve this problem if we could conclude that any of the actions in this typical
sequence are unlawful or that any of the actors are behaving in an impermissible manner. Unfortunately,
it is easy to empathize with each of the actors. The actions of presidents in these common situations are
predictable and laudable. If the country is experiencing a major new problem, and the president knows
that he cannot persuade Congress to address the problem by enacting a statute, it makes sense for him
to search for provisions of old statutes that he can try to stretch to support an action that allows the
government to address the problem.
If a state Attorney General concludes that an action taken by the federal government is unlawful,
injures a sovereign interest of the state, and would cause irreparable injury to the state, the attorney
general is acting in accordance with the duties of her office when she files a complaint and a motion for a
preliminary injunction. It is predictable and lawful for the attorney general to file complaint and the
motion in the district court that is most likely to grant the petition and the motion.
If a district judge concludes that a federal action that is the subject of a petition for review and a
motion for a preliminary injunction is probably unlawful and would cause irreparable harm, it is entirely
appropriate for the judge to grant the motion for a preliminary injunction. It is also entirely appropriate
for a majority of Supreme Court Justices to stay the preliminary injunction if they disagree with the district
court’s evaluation of the likely resolution of the merits of the dispute and for the Justices to allow the
preliminary injunction to remain in effect if they agree with the district court. It would make sense for the
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Court to grant or deny a motion for stay without writing an opinion in which it explains its action if the
stay is likely to remain in effect only for a brief period, but that is rarely the case.
The Supreme Court’s increased tendency to stay major government actions and to refuse to stay
preliminary injunctions of major government actions issued by lower courts is understandable. In 2015,
the Justices got a rude awakening to the reality that their decisions on the merits of major government
actions often have no real effect unless the government action is stayed pending review. In Michigan v.
EPA, the Court held that a major EPA action was invalid because the agency had not adequately considered
the cost of the action.40 The Court reversed the action and remanded the case to allow the EPA to comply
with its decision and to allow the circuit court to decide whether the EPA’s action on remand complied
with the Supreme Court’s mandate.41 Immediately after the Supreme Court issued that decision, EPA told
the press that the Court’s decision would have no real effect because the firms that were the targets of
the EPA action—electric utilities--had already made the billions of dollars of expenditures required to
comply with the action.42
The firms confirmed the accuracy of the EPA’s assertion shortly thereafter.43 The D.C. Circuit
convened an oral argument on remand from the Supreme Court’s decision to decide whether to vacate
the agency action pending the outcome of the proceedings on remand.44 I attended that argument. During
the argument, counsel for the utilities asked the D.C. Circuit not to vacate the action even though the
utilities were among the petitioners that had persuaded the Supreme Court to hold the action invalid.45
Counsel for the utilities explained that the utilities had already made the expenditures needed to comply
with the agency action and had persuaded their state public utility commissions to allow them to recover
their costs of compliance in the rates that they charge their customers. The utilities feared that a court
decision vacating the agency action would induce state regulators to disallow their costs of compliance
with the rule on the basis that they were not necessary expenditures. The D.C. Circuit complied with that
request and declined to vacate the agency action that the Supreme Court had held to be invalid.46
The statements of EPA and the utilities sent the message to the Court that its decisions holding
government actions invalid are exercises in futility in many cases unless the Supreme Court or a lower
court stays the government action immediately after the government announces the action. The Court’s
unprecedented decision to stay the CPP before any court had an opportunity to address the merits of the
CPP was a logical response to the message that the Court got from those statements. The Court recognized
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that it must stay a government action if it believes that it eventually will hold the action invalid to avoid
issuing opinions on the merits that are irrelevant by the time that they are issued.
Thus, it is easy to explain and to defend the steps taken by presidents, state attorney generals,
district judges, and Supreme Court Justices that have produced the enormous increase in the Supreme
Court’s shadow docket. Yet, that sequence of actions has produced an unacceptable situation.47 The
Supreme Court is now making many decisions that have massive permanent effects without ever issuing
an opinion in which it explains why it has made the decision. Thus, for instance, we will never know
whether President Trump’s unprecedented decision to reallocate billions of dollars in funds that Congress
had appropriated for other purposes to build a wall across the southern border was a lawful exercise of
the president’s emergency power, even though that action was implemented. We will also never know
whether EPA’s decision during the Obama administration to take the most effective action to mitigate
climate change that the country has ever taken was lawful even though that action was permanently
blocked by the Supreme Court’s decision.
We can guess that five Justices considered President Trump’s action to be legal and President
Obama’s action to be illegal, since the Court stayed the Obama action but declined to stay the Trump
action. Even if that educated guess is accurate, we will never know why President Trump’s action was
legal and why President Obama’s action was illegal. That is an unacceptable situation in a country that
claims to be governed by the rule of law. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized in other
contexts, compliance with the duty to engage in reasoned decision making is one of the most important
requirements of the rule of law.48
Potential Solutions
Ideally, we should address this problem at its source—the inability of Congress to legislate. I have
proposed some potential ways of addressing that problem,49 but it is not realistic to assume that Congress
will adopt those proposals or implement any other means of enhancing its power to legislate in the near
future. There is also no reason to expect that the extreme political polarity that underlies congressional
impotence will abate any time soon.
Given congressional impotence, we should praise any attempt by a president to identify a
statutory basis for an action that will respond effectively to a new problem even if the statute the
government relies on was enacted long ago and was never intended to be used to address the new
problem. The alternative—do nothing to address the new problem—would be far worse.
When a president of either party stretch’s the statutory authority of the executive branch to take
such an action, the next step is inevitable in today’s politically polarized environment. Leaders of the
opposition party will try to stop the president from taking the action by filing a complaint coupled with a
motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court could make it harder for state Attorney Generals
of the opposite party to succeed in blocking the president’s actions by overruling the five-to-four
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precedent that ensures that they will almost always have standing to obtain review of the actions that
they oppose.
That attempt to remedy the problem would be largely ineffective, however. In most cases there
would be other parties who have an incentive to seek review and the ability to demonstrate that they
have suffered the “concrete and particularized injury-in-fact” caused by the action that is required to
obtain standing to obtain review of the action.50 In the few cases in which no party with standing seeks
review, the lack of a petitioner with standing will be attributable to the breadth of the injuries caused by
the action. It would be strange if the Court began to acquiesce tacitly but routinely in presidential actions
that are illegal but are unreviewable because they cause severe injuries that are “shared by the many.”51
Congress could address the problem by making it more difficult for state Attorney Generals to file
their petitions for review in courts that they have chosen based on their well-founded belief that the court
has a strong bias in favor of the views of the Attorney Generals’ party and against the views of the
President’s party. Congress could eliminate the opportunity to engage in forum shopping by specifying
that all petitions for review can be filed only in the D.C. Circuit or only in a special three-judge district
court. That would reduce the problem to some uncertain extent, but it would create other problems, e.g.,
it would concentrate power in a few judges. Moreover, it is totally unrealistic to expect Congress to take
any action to address the problem in today’s conditions of extreme political polarity.
The Supreme Court could address the problem by making it more difficult for district courts to
enjoin government actions pending the outcome of review on the merits. It is not clear, however, whether
any such action would address the problem effectively without creating more serious problems. We have
had the present standard for issuing a stay or preliminary injunction for many decades. It is hard to
imagine an alternative standard that would be an improvement on the status quo.
The Court could issue an opinion in which it emphasizes the need for courts to exercise restraint
in applying that standard, but it is not clear that any such opinion would have the desired effect. The Court
attempted to send district courts the message that they should exercise restraint in issuing preliminary
injunctions in its 2008 opinion in Winter v. NRDC,52 but there is no evidence that district courts have
internalized that message and changed their approach. In fact, district courts have increased significantly
the number of preliminary injunctions that they have issued since 2008.53
Moreover, any action that the Court takes to limit the power of district courts to enjoin or stay
government actions would not apply to the Supreme Court itself. The “temporary” stay the Supreme Court
issued to stop the Obama EPA from implementing the Clean Power Plan and the many cases in which the
Court has refused to stay preliminary injunctions issued by district courts suggest that the Supreme Court
believes that courts should enjoin agency’s from implementing an action pending the outcome of
proceedings to review the merits of the action in many cases. In some important subset of cases, the Court
obviously approves of the decisions of the district courts to issue preliminary injunctions, while in another
subset of cases the Supreme Court disapproves of that decision. Unfortunately, we have no way of
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knowing why the Court approves of the issuance of preliminary injunctions in some cases and not in other
cases, since the Court never issues an opinion in which it explains its decision.
Some Justices have issued separate concurring or dissenting opinions in some of the cases in
which the Court has granted or denied a motion to stay a preliminary injunction without issuing an
opinion. Those opinions suggest that some of the Justices are particularly concerned about district court
preliminary injunctions that have national scope.54 The Court could respond to that concern by holding
that district courts can only issue preliminary injunctions that apply to the district or circuit in which the
court is located. Such a holding would not have any beneficial effect on the problem that I have identified,
however. It would change the situation only by limiting the scope of each preliminary injunction issued by
each district court and then stayed or not stayed by the Supreme Court without issuing an opinion.
A Supreme Court opinion that limits the permissible geographic scope of preliminary injunctions
would also have the unfortunate effect of creating a situation in which a federal statute is given widely
varying meanings in each region of the country. That situation could persist for many years, as our
experience with judicial efforts to reach agreement with respect to the meaning of “waters of the United
States” illustrates. District courts have adopted differing interpretations of the indeterminate four-onefour split among the Justices in Rapanos v. United States.55 The unfortunate result has been a legal regime
in which the EPA and the Corps of Engineers have been required to apply completely different
interpretations of that critically important jurisdictional term in different parts of the country for over a
decade.56
In fact, the separate opinions of the Justices that express their skepticism about the legality or
propriety of nationwide injunctions illustrate well the problem that the Court has created with its practice
of granting or denying stays of preliminary injunctions without issuing an opinion in which the Court
explains why it has taken either action. The separate opinions suggest that at least two of the Justices
decide to vote to stay or not to stay a preliminary injunction based in part on the geographic scope of the
injunction.57 They obviously do not believe that the scope of the injunction alone should be dispositive of
its legality, however, since they vote to uphold some nationwide injunctions. That leaves us with no way
of knowing the significance that those Justices attach to the scope of the injunction in their decisionmaking process. What are the other factors that they consider in deciding whether to stay a preliminary
injunction? How do they balance the factors that influence their decisions when they conflict? We also do
not know how many Justices agree with the apparent significance that two Justices attach to the
geographic scope of a preliminary injunction or any of the other factors that those Justices consider in
deciding whether to grant or deny stays of preliminary injunctions.
Having eliminated the possibility of addressing the problems created by the Supreme Court’s large
and growing shadow docket by making changes at any of the earlier points in the sequence of actions that
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leads to the shadow docket, we are left only with the possibility that the Court might eliminate the
problems by making some change in its own practices. The Court should adopt a practice of never issuing
an opinion that is likely to have significant long-term effects without issuing an opinion in which it explains
its action. By now it should be obvious to the Court that many, perhaps even most, of its decisions that
grant or deny stays of preliminary injunctions that bar the government from taking a major action will
have significant long-term effects. The Court should not issue such a stay without explaining its action.
Such a change in practice would add to the workload of the Justices, but that is a small price to pay to
reduce the adverse effects of a large and growing shadow docket that is rapidly eroding one of the most
important elements of the rule of law—the duty to engage in reasoned decision making.
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